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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, ) 
Plaintiff's and ) 
Appellants, 
vs. ) 
STAN WARREN, an individual, ) 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY, a partnership, ) 
Defendant's and ) 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 
890194-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue 
of Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. In the 
proceedings below, after a non-jury trial, Judge Bean of the 
Second Circuit Court, entered final judgment in favor of 
Respondents on their Counterclaim and against Appellants in the 
amount of $8,484 plus costs. Plaintiffs / Appellants seek 
reversal of the trial court on the issue of damages. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Are the formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
filed on March 13, 1989 and signed by the Court on March 24, 
1989, part of the record on appeal? 
2. Did the trial court err in assessing damages in this 
case? 
1 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a final Judgment of the Second 
Circuit Court, Davis County, Layton Department, signed and 
entered on February 10, 1989. 
The case started in Small Claims Court in Layton, Davis 
County, when Appellants (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 
"tenants") filed and served an Affidavit on Respondents 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "landlord") claiming 
that the landlord had failed to return a "deposit" after they had 
mutually surrendered a lease. The landlord filed a Counterclaim 
against the tenants claiming they had quit and breached the 
subject lease. The Counterclaim removed the jurisdiction to the 
Circuit Court. The tenants filed a Reply to the Counterclaim. 
After an Amended Counterclaim was fiiled and a Pre-trial held, 
the case was heard non-jury in the Second Circuit Court on August 
15, 1988, Judge K. Roger Bean presiding. 
At the close of trial and after some argument the Court 
found that the tenants had indeed committed an "anticipatory 
breach" of the lease and found in the landlords favor on that 
issue (trial transcript page 154). The Court was concerned with 
the proper measure of damages and took that issue under 
advisement (trial transcript page 163). 
Both sides submitted memoranda concerning the issue of 
damages and thereafter, the Court made a decision by minute entry 
dated December 27, 1988, awarding damages by reason of the breach 
as follows: $6,325.00 "reimbursement", net lost rent of $724.00 
and attorney's fees of $1,435.00 for a total amount of $8,484.00 
.2 
(Record pages 50, 51). Respondents counsel submitted a formal 
Judgment which was signed and entered on or about February 10, 
1989. 
Thereafter, and on or about March 9, 1989, Appellants filed 
a timely Notice of Appeal to the final Judgment. Bond, 
Designation of Record on Appeal and Request For Transcript were 
filed by Appellants with the Circuit Court on March 10, 1989 
(Record 63, 64). 
Thereafter, Apellants filed Objections To Formal Findings 
Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law filed by Respondents (Record 65 -
68) after the Judgment and after the appeals process had been 
filed. The trial judge has signed the Formal Findings Of Fact 
and Conclusions Of Law without comment and without ruling on 
Appellants objections thereto. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involved the alleged breach (or lack thereof) of 
a written lease for a three year term between Respondents 
(landlord) and Appellants (tenants). The tenants had initiated 
an action in small claims court to recover a rent deposit on the 
theory that the parties had mutually recinded the lease. The 
landlord countersued denying mutual recision and claiming the 
tenants had unilaterally breached the lease. 
In their counterclaim, the landlord sought damages for lost 
rentals and damages committed by tenant requiring repair and 
replacement by landlord (Record page 8). 
Neither party disputes the fact that when they began 
3 
negotiating for a lease in the spring of 1986, the building 
consisted of three unoccupied units, was brand new, "just a 
shell" and that it was the landlord's intent to "build to suit" 
in order to gain tenants (trial transcript page 82). The 
"special needs" of Appellant were six-foot interior (cubical) 
walls within the unit #2 and wall outlets to accommodate Tenants 
telephone system. (trial transcript-63). These special needs, 
along with general improvements (sheetrocking of exterior walls, 
paint and carpeting) were completed by landlord and the lease 
commenced April 5, 1986. 
Approximately one year later the tenants wanted out from 
under the lease. They believed the landlord had accepted a 
mutual recission since the landlord had identified a new tenant 
at a higher rent and for a longer term. The landlord claimed a 
unilateral breach had occurred and that he would hold the tenant 
responsible for any damages. The trial court found this issue in 
favor of the landlord and although Appellant believed this issue 
could and should have been found otherwise, no appeal therefrom 
is made because evidence does exist supporting the trial court's 
determination. 
On the issue of damages, the landlord offered numerous 
exhibits consisting of carjcelled checks, receipts, invoices and 
other vouchers, all relating to expenses incurred after the 
claimed breach (mid-March, 1987). The landlord offered no 
evidence with regard to expenses incurred in preparing the unit 
for the Appellants other than to estimate that the original 
carpet cost was $1,600 - $1,800 (trial transcript page 116). 
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The total of the expenses represented by the exhibits were 
$12,649.32, The increased value to landlord of the new lease for 
the time remaining on the old lease was $5,040. The court found 
th.at the measure of recoverable damages as caused by tenants 
breach were those portions of the total post-breach expenses of 
landlords improvements "usable for any tenant". The Court found 
that improvements to suit, satisfy or induce the particular new 
tenant were not recoverable. (See Record page 51, second 
paragraph). 
The trial court concluded that 50? of the post-breach 
expenses offerred by landlord were attributable to mitigation and 
"usable by any tenant" and affixed a dollar figure of $6,325 
(record, page 51). No offset against this amount was given for 
the $5,040 net benefit that landlord derived from the new lease. 
The trial court accordingly added these improvement 
expenses to lost rentals (after set-off for prepaid rent) of 
$724.00, attorney's fees of $1,435.00 and court costs of $5.00 
for a total amount of $8,489. Judgment for $8,489 was entered on 
February 10, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed 
and entered after Notice of Appeal was filed should not be 
considered part of the Record on Appeal. They are procedurally 
deficient and from a substantive standpoint confusing as they 
read differently than the "minute entry" decision upon which the 
Judgment appealed from is based. 
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In addition, the evidence before the trial court was not 
sufficient to support the damages awarded using the court formula 
or measure of damages in cases of this kind. The trial court 
guessed or speculated on damages rather than applying the 
evidence before it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING AND MAKING A PART OF THE 
RECORD FORMAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER THE 
APPEAL PROCESS STARTED. 
On December 27, 1988, Judge Bean, by way of Minute Entry, 
issued his "Decision on Matters taken under Advisement" (Record, 
page 50). Copies were mailed to counsel. 
Thereafter, on February 2, 1989, Respondents counsel filed 
a Cost Affidavit and Proposed Judgment (Record, pages 52 - 54). 
No proposed formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
then submitted. Judge Bean signed the Judgment on February 10, 
1989. 
Thereafter on March 9, 1989, Appellants filed their Notice 
of Appeal (Record 55 - 56), followed by Cost Bond, Designation of 
Record and Request for Transcript on March 10, 1989 (Record, 
pages 57 - 62). 
On or about March 10, 1989, counsel for Appellants received 
by mail a copy of proposed formal Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and timely filed Objections thereto. (Record, 
pages 63 - 64) , The original Proposed Findings of Fact and 
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compensable while expenses "for the p a r t i c u l a r (new) t enan t " are 
no t . 
In a d d i t i o n , Appel lants have had no opor tun i ty to ques t ion 
t h e s u b s t a n t i v e c o n t e n t of f o r m a l F i n d i n g s of F a c t and 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law s igned by a t r i a l c o u r t u n t i l t h i s w r i t i n g . 
The problem becomes g l a r i n g l y obv ious when t h e "minu te e n t r y " 
memorandum d e c i s i o n i s compared t o t h e fo rmal F i n d i n g s of Fac t 
and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law s igned by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a f t e r t h e appea l 
p r o c e s s s t a r t e d . The " m i n u t e e n t r y " memorandum d e c i s i o n 
concludes t h a t expenses "usable for any t enan t " are recoverable 
•in t h i s case , but t h a t expenses "for p a r t i c u l a r t enan t " are not . 
The "minute en t ry" memorandum dec is ion then f a c t u a l l y f inds t h a t 
50% of t h e t o t a l expenses i n t r o d u c e d as ev idence r e l a t e d t o t h e 
former and were recoverable and the remaining 50% r e l a t e d to the 
l a t t e r and were not r ecove rab l e . 
C o n t r a s t t h a t l anguage t o t h e fo rma l F i n d i n g s of Fac t and 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law s igned and e n t e r e d a f t e r t h e No t i ce of 
Appeal . Pa rag raph 9 of t h e F i n d i n g s of Fac t r e c i t e s : 
"That 50% of Defendant 's improvements were 
for general improvement of the premises or 
another t enan t and not expended as a r e s u l t 
of the l e a se between the p a r t i e s , 
(emphasis ours) 
This v e r s i o n lumps t o g e t h e r both g e n e r a l improvement 
expenses and s p e c i a l expenses for a p a r t i c u l a r new t e n a n t and 
says t o g e t h e r they amount t o 50% and are not compensab le . I t 
then says the other 50% were expendable as a r e s u l t of the l e a se 
between the p a r t i e s . (emphasis ours) 
This v e r s i o n i s in d i r e c t c o n t r a s t w i th the memorandum 
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to the facts and evidence in this case that Appellants find fault 
with the trial court. 
The evidence offerred by the landlord at trial and the 
relief sought in the pleadings and through statements at pre-
trial are vastly different. 
In his Amended Counterclaim the landlord sought in 
paragraph 6, "$860.00 in lost rental income", and in paragraph 7, 
damages for destruction of the premises requiring expenditures 
of..."over $8,000.00 for repairs and replacement". In other 
words, the landlord was seeking lost rentals and compensation for 
damages to the premises. 
At pre-trial, and after having discussed claims of damages 
to the premises and lost rent, counsel for the landlord raised, 
for the first time, the issue of damages by reason of the initial 
expense in constructing special six-foot walls to meet 
Appellant's needs (pre-trial transcript 7). The following 
exchange took place: 
"MR. OLMSTEAD: So part of your claim is 
based on the initial expense. 
MR. COLTON: It would be entirely on the 
initial expense of building pursuant to 
the Plaintiffs' instructions plus the 
damages. I think that the measure of 
damages would be those two items together, 
not singularly. 
The third item of damage would be that 
amount for breach of the lease, that 
amount of the rent. 
THE COURT: You are going to claim that 
they prepared the premises for your 
clients — 
MR. COLTON: Exactly, Your Honor. 
i n 
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perform the lease :i n coinp 1 iance w i th theI r 
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wal l s or o ther s p e c i a l improvements made to s u i t the Appel lants 
s p e c i a l n e e d s . The l a n d l o r d did p l a c e i n t o e v i d e n c e i n v o i c e 
a f t e r i n v o i c e w i t h r e g a r d t o expenses i n c u r r e d in c o m p l e t e l y 
r e n o v a t i n g t h e i n t e r i o r of t h e u n i t a f t e r t h e A p p e l l a n t s l e f t . 
In l o o k i n g a t t h e s e expenses and in f i x i n g damages, t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y t r i e d t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between t h o s e expenses 
t h a t could bene f i t any new tenan t and those expenses b e n e f i t i n g 
only t h e p a r t i c u l a r new t e n a n t (Record 51) . The c o u r t r easoned 
t h a t g e n e r a l improvement expenses were in " m i t i g a t i o n " (Record 
51 ) . 
The problem w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e a s o n i n g i s t h a t t h e 
b u i l d i n g was a s h e l l t o beg in w i t h . C e r t a i n i m p r o v e m e n t s were 
made as an inducement t o ge t A p p e l l a n t s t o l e a s e , some g e n e r a l 
(painted w a l l s , ca rpe t , e tc . ) and some spec i a l ( s ix - foo t w a l l s ) . 
When Appel lants l e f t , the landlord undertook a d d i t i o n a l expense. 
I f Appel lants damaged the premises , they would be r e spons ib l e for 
expenses of r e p a i r . They would not be r e s p o n s i b l e for o t h e r 
a d d i t i o n a l improvemen t s , g e n e r a l or s p e c i a l , because to do so 
would put the landlord in a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n than h i s e n t i t l e m e n t s 
of only being r e s to red to h i s p r i o r p o s i t i o n . 
I t was t h e l a n d l o r d ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p r o v e , not only a 
breach of the l e a s e , but the damages t h a t n a t u r a l l y flowed from 
t h a t b r e a c h . As p r e v i o u s l y men t ioned , Respondents adv i sed a t 
p r e - t r i a l t h a t t hey would o f f e r e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l not only of 
l o s t r e n t a l s and damages to the premises , but evidence of s p e c i a l 
expendi tu res made and l o s t in r e l i a n c e on the l ease con t r ac t with 
Appel lan ts . I t would seem t h a t such expendi tures would be easy 
12 
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awarded and the case should be remanded with instructions to 
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